Interpretability in PRA

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- Example: $(\varphi \rhd \psi) \wedge (\psi \rhd \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rhd \chi)$

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- That's were PRA comes in

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- $(\alpha \rhd_{\mathsf{PRA}} \beta) \to ((\alpha \wedge \Box\gamma) \rhd_{\mathsf{PRA}} (\beta \wedge \Box\gamma))$ whenever $\alpha \in \Sigma_2$

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- In other words: $\alpha,\ \beta \in \Delta_2$

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- Is this all?

The logic IL

L1: $\Box(A \to B) \to (\Box A \to \Box B)$
L2: $\Box A \to \Box\Box A$
L3: $\Box(\Box A \to A) \to \Box A$

J1: $\Box(A \to B) \to A \rhd B$
J2: $(A \rhd B) \wedge (B \rhd C) \to A \rhd C$
J3: $(A \rhd C) \wedge (B \rhd C) \to A \vee B \rhd C$
J4: $A \rhd B \to (\Diamond A \to \Diamond B)$
J5: $\Diamond A \rhd A$

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- $w \Vdash A \rhd B$ iff $\forall u \ (wRu \wedge u \Vdash A \Rightarrow \exists v (uS_w v \Vdash B))$

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- Beklemishev is somewhat similar

A B-simulation on a frame is a binary relation $\mathcal{S}$ for which the following holds.

1. $\mathcal{S}(x, x') \rightarrow x{\uparrow} = x'{\uparrow}$
2. $\mathcal{S}(x, x')\ \&\ xRy \rightarrow \exists y'(yS_x y' \wedge \mathcal{S}(y, y') \wedge y'S_{x'}{\uparrow} \subseteq yS_x{\uparrow})$

$F \models \mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{B}}$ if and only if there is a B-simulation $\mathcal{S}$ on F such that for all x and y,

$$xRy \rightarrow \exists y'(yS_x y' \wedge \mathcal{S}(y, y') \wedge \forall d, e\ (y'S_x dRe \rightarrow yRd)).$$

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \mathsf{ES}_2^0 & := & \mathsf{ED}_2 \\ \blacktriangleright\ \mathsf{ES}_2^{n+1} & := & \mathsf{ES}_2^n \mid \mathsf{ES}_2^{n+1} \wedge \mathsf{ES}_2^{n+1} \mid \mathsf{ES}_2^{n+1} \vee \mathsf{ES}_2^{n+1} \mid \\ & & \neg(\mathsf{ES}_2^n \rhd \mathsf{Form}) \end{array}$$

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- **Theorem**

  A finite frame F validates all instances of Beklemishev's principle if and only if $\forall i\ F \models \mathcal{C}_i$.

- $\mathsf{B} \vdash \mathsf{Z}$

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- Frame condition Zambella?